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Grazing the Desert
In the late 1970's the BLM commissioned Dana Yensen of the
University of Idaho to write a report on vegetation change in
the Birds of Prey Area. "A Grazing History of Southern Idaho
with Emphasis on the Birds of Prey Study Area" (Boise District
BLM, 1980) makes fascinating reading. Yensen exhaustively read
early accounts of vegetation, studied early sketches and paintings,
pored over historical photographs, and in some cases was able
to go to sites in those photographs and take identical pictures
eighty years later.
Yensen concentrated on some of Idaho's driest rangeland,
in the Birds of Prey Area, but her findings are relevant to all
of Idaho's high desert. She found that the presettlement landscape
basically consisted of sagebrush, with winterfat in the drier
areas. Basin wild rye occasionally towered over the shrubs. Forbs
and bunchgrasses were abundant in the understory. Early settlers
felt that the range was so rich that it could support large numbers
of livestock in perpetuity.
This changed quickly. The Oregon Trail was an early
casualty of overgrazing, with some 180,000 head of livestock
passing over the trail in peak years. Emigrants were forced to
camp far from the route so their stock could graze.
Away from the emigrant trails, horses--not cattle
or sheep--were the main domestic livestock. They were usually
in demand for agriculture and transportation, and excess horses
could be driven long distances to remote markets. Unfortunately,
horses (wild and domesticated) are among the most destructive
animals on the range.
The next round of domestic livestock was sheep, which
became the dominant livestock when the railroads came to southern
Idaho in the 1880's. Sheep require tending for defense against
predators, but they don't need nearly as much water as cattle.
They can range farther from streams and over rougher terrain.
At the turn of the century, Owyhee County supported millions
of sheep Animal Use Months (AUM's). (Each AUM stands for five
sheep feeding for one month.)
Sheep markets and numbers have drastically declined
since those days. Today, most sheep range is in better condition
than cattle range, simply because sheep numbers are down. Many
Idaho livestockmen want to convert their BLM allotments from
sheep to cattle.
Cattle came last as major domestic grazers. Their
great weight and appetites made them excellent range destroyers,
as they could compact the soil even as they removed its protective
vegetative covering--leading to instant erosion. However, cattle's
traditional range is restricted by their bovine nature and their
thirst for water. They tend to congregate along streams, damaging
riparian areas by eating vegetation and breaking down stream
banks. The first removes shade and warms the water, the second
silts in the stream bed.
How severe were the effects of overgrazing across
southern Idaho? Studies have shown that rangeland grazed only
by wildlife produces from 400 to 800 pounds of dry forage per
acre. Today, the average rangeland grazed by domestic livestock
produces less than 100 pounds per acre. The toll has been enormous
in eroded soil, degraded streams, reduced wildlife populations,
and loss of ecosystem diversity.
Range Management
Range researchers and managers have evolved several techniques
for dealing with excessive cattle use. The first and simplest
is salting. Cattle crave salt. If you put a salt block a mile
from a creek, cattle will amble over to the salt, feeding along
the way and in the area, lick the salt and get thirsty, return
to the creek for a drink, and then, craving salt, work their
way back to the salt. The trick is that you must move the salt
block frequently--something ranchers don't like to do.
The second is to have an accurate count of the number
of cows on the range. This is accomplished through tagging cattle--usually
in the ear. Most of the last few decades' scant improvement in
Idaho rangelands can be attributed to this step. Even so, the
acreages involved are so great and the number of BLM employees
so small, that trespass grazing is a common occurrence.
The third is to delay turnout of cattle in the spring.
Starting grazing on April 15 instead of March 15 can give grasses
a tremendous head start. The BLM is now doing more of this.
Fourth is to have cattle on the range when grass
seeds have matured and dropped. Such "deferred grazing"
allows trampling the seed into the soil, so it has a better chance
of germinating next year. (Of course, elk or deer or buffalo
could do the same thing.)
The fifth is to fence the range, to allow a combination
of spring grazing and summer trampling. One year an area is grazed
in spring and rested in summer; the next year, the opposite.
Most years the area is grazed in the fall, also. Another approach
is to divide an area into four pastures. One is left ungrazed
each year. This is "rest rotation" grazing. The principle
is to emulate a herd of bison or elk that hits an area hard but
doesn't return for a few more years.
This and other "grazing systems" are of
questionable value on already-depleted rangelands. They hit palatable
plants hard, but usually leave less desireable plants untouched--helping
the nasties outcompete the goodies. They play havoc with recreationists:
you may hike an area in its ungrazed year, and return with all
your friends the next, only to find it heavily grazed.
Fencing is being used more and more to protect riparian
areas. A well-maintained fence can allow the stream and its banks
to recover in a surprisingly short time. A classic example is
the Clover Creek hike. One issue in wilderness management is,
since grazing continues, should new fences be built in a wilderness
to protect streams? Most environmental groups such as the Committee
for Idaho's High Desert have taken a hard line, and resisted
such fences.
A sixth technique for reducing cattle impacts is
to provide water supplies in otherwise dry areas. The rationale
is this: certain areas near water sources are severely overgrazed.
If new water sources are established in hitherto undergrazed
areas, cattle use can be spread over a wider area, and the overgrazed
areas can recover. This sounds like a good idea, but the theory
is better than the practice. All too often, these water developments
lead to overgrazing in previously ungrazed or undergrazed areas,
while the original overgrazed areas aren't appreciably improved.
A seventh technique is to manipulate an area's vegetation
to produce more forage. Like creating water sources, this can
help spread out use and alleviate grazing pressure. Again, the
practice is worse than the theory. The Dust Bowl crisis and that
era's conservation ethic combined to create a monster called
crested wheatgrass.
This grass from Asia was and is hailed as a miracle
grass--a perennial bunchgrass which is palatable to cattle, resists
grazing pressure, establishes roots that hold the soil, doesn't
burn much, and produces abundant, vigorous seed.
The problem is that millions of acres in Idaho have
been seeded to pure stands of crested wheatgrass. (This is most
prominent along the Bruneau-Three Creek Road.) This is fine for
cattle, which have little fear of predators (or man), eat a pure
grass diet, and don't need much cover. Wildlife, however, from
small rodents to birds to large mammals, finds large stands of
pure grass unattractive, and avoid them. (And frankly, crested
wheatgrass is ugly and unnatural looking.)
Forbs and shrubs are increasingly being included
in BLM crested wheatgrass seedings. This is an important step
forward.
Along with seeding, "brush control" is
another way of manipulating vegetation. The idea is that large
sagebrush plants outcompete desireable grasses for scarce water.
If you use chemicals, machinery, or fire to kill the sagebrush,
you release the grasses and improve grazing. Chemical means are
definitely the worst of the group, since the chemicals also kill
most of the area's forbs. This is a stupid approach, since fires
have drastically reduced Idaho's brushy areas. Further, brush
areas are more valuable to wildlife than grass areas.
The fifth, sixth, and seventh techniques--fencing,
water projects, and vegetation manipulation--are referred to
as "range improvements". From 50 to 75 percent of all
grazing fees are plowed back into them!
The author has his own ideas about grazing management.
He favors no increases in grazing on ungrazed or undergrazed
rangelands: those areas in good or excellent condition (the very
areas that ranchers cherish). Instead, all efforts should be
expended on improving conditions on presently overgrazed lands:
those areas in poor condition. They should be seeded with superstrains
of native grasses, forbs, and brush. It wouldn't take much agency
commitment to produce such strains: the money currently devoted
to research on exotic species (like crested wheatgrass) could
be redirected to native species.
Early Grazing
Millions of sheep in Owyhee County: that was far too many
for the range. Why did this happen? The roots of the tragedy
lie in America's attitudes towards its public domain.
Originally, the government viewed its land as a source
of revenue, with the General Land Office (GLO) functioning mainly
as a survey and sales agency. A change came when, to encourage
settlement, the Homestead Act of 1862 was passed. This allowed
farmers to "prove up" on 160 acres by cultivating the
land. Often an individual, his wife, and perhaps his children
and hired hands would each prove up on 160 acres.
As time went by, the government realized that the
public domain would never pass into private hands 160 acres at
a time. That size homestead was simply too small for the West's
rangelands, so special stock-raising homesteads were allowed
to reach 320 and finally 640 acres. In addition, almost any land
could be purchased at low prices. However, the government still
couldn't dispose of its public domain rangelands.
But the government wouldn't manage them, either.
National Forests were created across the West from 1895 to 1905,
and were further enlarged through the teens and twenties. A major
reason for creating these was watershed protection, not timber
harvest. Depleted mountain grasses had led to increased runoff
and erosion, and consequently to lowered water tables and flooding.
Many Westerners supported the Forest Service.
But grasslands continued to be an embarassment to
the government. GLO lands were open range, where anyone who could
find forage could utilize it. In the absence of regulation, abuse
began early, and continued. There was a tremendous advantage
to being the first person to trail sheep or cattle through an
area. You not only got ungrazed vegetation, but you denied forage
to your competition.
The result was heavy pressure on rangelands in the
springtime, when plants rely on stored energy to produce their
vital first leaves. These first leaves produce energy the plant
needs to grow; grazing on them severely retards plant growth.
If a second band of livestock arrives before a plant has recovered,
its vigor declines drastically, and it produces less seed, and
has less ability to survive a fire.
Since the GLO refused to manage public domain rangelands,
the burden fell on local stockmen. Their efforts to organize
were frequently sabotaged by transient stockmen who had just
as much claim to the range as the locals. In some cases, effective
cattlemen's or sheepmen's associations were formed that kept
transients out--sometimes at gunpoint.
Today's stockmen are often quick to parade their
Idaho heritage, and their ancestors' years as ranchers. Then,
when the question of Dust Bowl conditions on the rangelands is
raised, blame is quickly assigned to the transients--not the
upstanding ancestors. The author wonders...
Another problem centered on man-caused fires. Fire
usually doesn't hurt healthy sagebrush-grass rangelands; they
come back next year in glorious grasses and forbs. A second consecutive
year of fire hurts the range, however, and a third year is disastrous.
Yet sheepherders, remembering that first post-fire year, routinely
started fires. (Railroads also deserve some blame here: hotboxes
on railcars could start a linear fire many miles long.)
Since the Dust Bowl
At any rate, conditions came to a head in the 1930's. The
Great Plains Dust Bowl was mirrored in southern Idaho, where
years of range abuse combined with widespread poverty and drought
to produce the ultimate grazing disaster. The New Deal mentality
said that government could solve problems, and a new generation
of soil and range specialists were unleashed on the West.
Their first efforts demonstrated that "scientific"
range management, coupled with federal investment, could restore
depleted rangelands. Stockmen took notice, and they supported
passage of the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act. At the same time Roosevelt,
recognizing that much Western rangeland was not suitable for
settlement, withdrew most public domain lands from entry. (In
1984 the Idaho BLM published an excellent booklet called "The
Taylor Grazing Act: 50 Years of Progress". It is full of
anecdotes about Idaho grazing history. Try to find a copy!)
The Taylor Grazing Act established a Grazing Service
with a mission of regulating public domain rangelands. In accord
with the law, it restricted grazing rights to people with a "base
property", and transients were banned. In accord with its
rancher head's sympathies, local grazing advisory boards were
given great authority.
In proceedings shrouded in secrecy, grazing district
and allotment boundaries were drawn up. Those boundaries have
remained essentially unchanged since the Thirties.
In addition, mysterious numbers called "preferences"
were selected. These have some relation to: the number of animals
that had grazed an area in good years; the number of animals
that Grazing Service "graziers" believed the range
could support; the number of animals stockmen wished they could
run, eventually; and the number of animals actually grazing the
devastated Dust Bowl era rangelands. These preferences still
affect BLM management.
In 1946, Congress merged the Grazing Service and
the GLO to form a new agency: the Bureau of Land Management.
The two traditional roles of the BLM are sometimes mocked by
referring to it as the "Bureau of Livestock and Mining".
The BLM corrected some of the worst grazing abuses, but it was
hampered by a confused legal authority and the lack of a multiple-use
philosophy.
This changed in October 1976, when the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act became law. This bill gave the BLM
an Organic Act, such as the Forest Service had had since 1905.
FLPMA (pronounced "Flipma") gave the BLM a clear multiple-use
mandate. An agency which had been almost entirely devoted to
grazing since 1934 faced a major challenge.
Under Cecil Andrus's guidance as Secretary of the
Interior, it responded very well. A new generation of recreation,
wildlife, archaeology, and soil and vegetation specialists ("FLPMA
babies") rejuvenated the agency. Although most managers
were old-line range specialists, the newcomers' enthusiasm was
responsible for some behind-the-scenes victories.
Nevertheless, a reaction to FLPMA was brewing among
ranchers. They resented BLM grazing plans, which forced short-term
grazing cutbacks (while promising long-term gains). Some were
upset that FLPMA seemed to put even more restrictions on land
sales than before (including, for example, the Birds of Prey
Area withdrawal). And they especially resented the BLM wilderness
study process which FLPMA mandated. That study began just like
the Forest Service's RARE II study did: with the publication
of a map that showed huge chunks of Idaho BLM land as potential
wilderness.
The rancher reaction became known (and institutionalized)
as the Sagebrush Rebellion. And in 1980, Ronald Reagan told the
group, "I am a Sagebrush Rebel." Upon election, he
appointed James Watt to Secretary of the Interior. A stronger
contrast between Watt and Andrus could not be imagined--and the
BLM was one of the most strongly affected agencies. At rancher
insistence, Watt took the unprecedented step of firing Robert
Buffington, Idaho's BLM State Director.
When a State Director falls, Range Conservationists,
Area Managers, and District Managers all take heed. BLM grazing
plans and multiple-use plans, mandated by FLPMA and court decisions,
were deeply flawed--and their implementation sidetracked by rancher
resistance.
BLM wilderness studies concentrated on areas with
demonstrable natural beauty, ignoring areas with outstanding
natural and recreational potential. Typical examples include
most Owyhee Plateau roadless areas: the BLM recommends rim-to-rim
wilderness, and includes almost no areas on the adjacent plateaus.
These plateau areas are vitally important for the wildlife of
the canyon country, and for recreation.
How can the BLM recover from its total politicization?
The best remedy is for you, the reader to become active. You
don't have to join an environmental organization, although there
are excellent ones such as the Committee for Idaho's High Desert
(CIHD, pronounced "kid") working hard on Idaho desert
issues.
All you have to do is drive and walk and see the
desert. And when you do, and when you do or don't like what see,
call or write or visit the BLM (or your congressmen) and tell
them how you feel. If as many recreationists give input to the
BLM and Congress as do ranchers, there will be change.
Afterwords
Well, it's 1999, and the words above, written hopefully a
dozen years ago, have really not come true.
The author experienced the incredible pleasure of
attending hearings on the Air Force's Owyhee Plateau bombing
range expansion, and of seeing that many people opposing the
action had been turned on to the desert through his book...yet
the result was another defeat. Similarly, the Middle Snake
River Plain has been swept with a series of catastrophic fires,
almost eliminating shrubs from a million acres...
Some day, the government will once again spend billions
on its depleted rangelands. BLM managers will once again enjoy
vast budgets and huge staffs. The author hopes and prays that
the direction of this future range restoration effort will be
toward native ecosystems, instead of more exotic grasses. And
he hopes that enough pieces of native ecosystems remain to put
together the whole again. |
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